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THE UNCERTAIN FOUNDATION OF WORK PRODUCT
Michael A. Blasie1
INTRODUCTION
Work product is a cornerstone of legal practice.  Alongside the at-
torney-client privilege it forms the great bulwarks protecting attorney
efforts from an adversary.  Its significance pervades all litigation
phases, from discovery to trial preparation.  Yet how to classify the
doctrine is elusive; it has overtones with discovery, procedural, evi-
dentiary, and privilege issues.
But the true dilemma stems much deeper.  Overlooked by scholars,
practitioners, and courts alike are two crucial and fundamental issues:
the basis for the doctrine and its proper scope.  This Article docu-
ments the bizarre, untold origin story of this pivotal doctrine.  The
story takes us from the Supreme Court’s invention of the doctrine,
through its uncertain foundations, to its present, vital role in legal
practice. On this journey, this Article identifies previously ignored as-
sumptions that form the very roots of work product.
Work product originated in the seminal 1947 Supreme Court deci-
sion of Hickman v. Taylor.2  But its birth was hardly traditional.
While earlier cases disputed the concept, the phrase “work product”
originated at oral argument before the Third Circuit.3  After the Third
Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court took a rare step; it rejected a
proposed codified work product rule, granted certiorari, and decided
Hickman on public policy grounds.4
The doctrine’s growth post-Hickman is even more unusual.  Several
decades after Hickman, amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil and
Criminal Procedure codified work product rules.5  But these codified
1. Michael Blasie is a graduate of the New York University School of Law and litigator in
Colorado who currently serves as law clerk to The Honorable David Richman of the Colorado
Court of Appeals.  Special thanks to Professor Arthur R. Miller for his advice on this Article and
for being a dedicated teacher and mentor who instilled a love of procedure.  Also thanks to
Professor Gabriel Rauterberg for his unquenchable wisdom, patience, enthusiasm, and
friendship.
2. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 496 (1947).
3. Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 223 (3d Cir. 1945).
4. See infra notes 84–99 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 150–160 and accompanying text.
35
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versions did not mirror the language of Hickman.  On the contrary,
they diverged significantly.  No one knows why.  Stranger still is how
courts reacted to this conflict.  Instinctively, one would think the
Rules preempt Hickman.  Yet consistently federal courts have held
the opposite.  Like a Venn diagram, there is dual authority such that
materials are protected either by a Federal Rule, Hickman, or both.6
Three essential questions arise.  First, what is the basis of Hickman
v. Taylor?  Was the Supreme Court interpreting the Federal Rules,
filling a gap in the Rules, creating a common law doctrine broader
than the Rules, or doing something else?  The classification informs
whether Hickman endures after the passage of the codified Rules.
Second, under what authority can federal courts expand a doctrine
beyond the limits of a Federal Rule?  By keeping Hickman alive,
courts produced a unique doctrine that pulls from two very different
sources of authority that define the doctrine differently.  Third, given
the answers to the preceding questions, is Hickman v. Taylor still
binding law?
This Article answers these questions by tracking and interpreting
the history of work product.  Part II outlines its birth and evolution
beginning with the history and events leading to Hickman v. Taylor.
In doing so, it describes the unusual setting that primed the decision.
What becomes clear is that work product arose shortly after the
United States switched to a discovery-based civil justice system.  Some
courts obeyed the strict contours of the then recently released Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure; others pursued a gut reaction to protect the
attorney-client relationship.  Then, in Hickman, the Supreme Court
created the doctrine based on public policy.  Work product emerged
as an intensely practical doctrine that protects attorney work, but
yields to an adversary’s need to discover essential facts.  The Article
continues by describing the evolution of the doctrine post-Hickman,
including reactions to the case, the creation of codified work product
rules, and how federal courts treated Hickman in light of these rules.
Part III draws upon the history of work product and the Supreme
Court’s post-Hickman decisions to answer the three questions
presented above.  It concludes work product is not one doctrine, but
two: the Hickman work product doctrine and the codified work prod-
uct doctrine.  More specifically, (i) the Hickman work product doc-
trine is still good law and is, at least in part, more expansive than the
codified work product doctrine; (ii) federal courts can apply the Hick-
man doctrine beyond the scope of codified work product rules
6. See infra notes 174–185 and accompanying text.
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through an exercise of inherent power; and (iii) the codified work
product doctrine preempts the Hickman work product doctrine when
the two conflict.
Work product is about much more than the balance between a pro-
ductive attorney-client relationship and the need to discover relevant
material.  Rather, it is about who strikes this balance.  The animating
principle behind these conclusions is that work product is subject to
complete legislative control.  While the judiciary invented the doc-
trine, the legislature controls our judicial system.  From the number of
federal courts, to the procedural and substantive rules of the civil jus-
tice system, all are subject to legislative control.  There is a realm Con-
gress cannot control, but work product is not in it.
II. THE BIRTH AND EVOLUTION OF WORK PRODUCT
The switch to a discovery-based system maximized parties’ ability to
gain knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.7  But courts
quickly developed limits on this ability; the work product doctrine be-
ing one.8  It is a practical doctrine that recognizes attorneys serve both
the advancement of justice and the interests of their clients.9  It pro-
tects from disclosure an attorney’s case preparation materials, like re-
search memoranda and witness interviews.10  But its protection is not
absolute.
“The central justification for the work product doctrine is that it
preserves the privacy of preparation that is essential to the attorney’s
adversary role.  Any invasion of this privacy could distort or modify
the attorney’s function to the detriment of the adversary system.”11
An additional rationale “emphasizes the need to protect the privacy of
the attorney’s mental processes.”12
Work product consists of several principles.  First, information re-
garding facts and witness statements are not protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege.13  Second, the need to protect a lawyer’s files
from discovery is important to the justice system but does not make
the files absolutely immune from discovery.14  Third, the party seeking
7. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
8. Id. at 507–08.
9. Id. at 510.
10. Id. at 511.
11. Jeff A. Anderson, Gina E. Cadieux, George Hays E., and Michael B. Hingerty, Work
Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 760, 784–85 (1983).
12. Id.
13. 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2022 (3d ed. 2010).
14. Id.
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disclosure bears the burden of showing special circumstances warrant
disclosure.15  Fourth, when the moving party can obtain the desired
information elsewhere, it is not a special circumstance.16  Though
work product covers both attorney and non-attorney case preparation,
work revealing the mental processes and opinions of attorneys is par-
ticularly sacrosanct.17
The uniqueness and complexity of work product cannot be under-
stated.  As Professor Clermont observed:
Work product is the legal doctrine that central casting would send
over. First, it boasts profundities, arising as it does from the collid-
ing thrusts of our discovery and trial processes and from conflicting
currents in our modified adversary system.  Second, it will surface
frequently, because the protected materials are commonly created
by each side but uncommonly useful to the opponent.  Third, it has
generated a small mountain of lower-court case law, with the foot-
hills forming a labyrinth of rules and wrinkles. In short, work prod-
uct has for a couple of generations dramatically bewitched
academics, bothered practitioners, and bewildered students.18
Often overlooked, however, is the history of work product.  Tracking
its origins and evolution explains why the Supreme Court created it
and how work product has changed.  This history also reveals the
questionable assumptions modern courts, practitioners, and scholars
rely upon.
A. The Pre-Hickman Universe
The pre-Hickman landscape was almost primordial.  It was a time of
galactic change and uncertainty.  Most notably the federal system had
recently switched from a minimalist discovery process to a liberal one,
and the first version of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had just
issued. Hickman raised an issue on the minds of many.  But it was an
issue that had no name, no doctrine, no rule on point, and no appel-
late authority.  Into this morass, the Supreme Court dove headfirst.
Pre-1938 discovery and civil procedure is virtually unrecognizable
to the modern era.  There were no comprehensive federal civil rules.19
Discovery was intensely limited.20  The “sporting” theory of justice
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975).
18. Kevin Clermont, Surveying Work Product, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 758, 775 (1983).
19. Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938
Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 698–701 (1998).
20. William A. Morrow, Comment, Ambiguities After the 1970 Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery of Experts and Attorney’s Work Product, 17
WAYNE L. REV. 1145, 1147–48 (1971). See also 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2001.
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ruled and “a judicial proceeding was a battle of wits rather than a
search for the truth, each side was protected to a large extent against
disclosure of its case.”21  There was very little document discovery and
limited depositions.22  Indeed, depositions “were intended only for the
preservation of proof; any discovery that resulted was only accidental
and incidental.”23  Federal courts had limited discretionary power to
authorize greater discovery and rarely exercised such power.24  Unsur-
prisingly, there was no discussion of protecting attorney trial prepara-
tion materials.  “Because his client’s case was largely immune from
discovery in American courts prior to the Federal Rules, an attorney
had no need for a protective doctrine either at law or in equity.”25
Beginning in the early 1900s some practitioners began advocating
for uniform federal rules of civil procedure.26  Although an act re-
quired federal courts to apply the procedure of the state in which they
sat, this at times conflicted with federal procedural statutes and prac-
tices thereby causing costly confusion and difficulty predicting proce-
dure.27  There was also significant criticism of the often non-codified
state court procedure, and a belief that uniform federal rules could
provide a model for states to adopt.28
Finally, the movement succeeded with the 1934 passage of the Rules
Enabling Act, which permitted the Supreme Court to create uniform
rules for federal courts.29  In 1938 the first Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure (FRCP) issued.30  The FRCP merged law and equity, simpli-
fied pleadings, and eliminated many restraints on discovery.31  It also
permitted more discovery than any state did at the time.32
21. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2001.
22. Subrin, supra note 19, at 698–701. See also 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13,
§§ 2001–2002; Anderson et al., supra note 11, at 765. R
23. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2002.
24. Morrow, supra note 20, at 1147–48.
25. Anderson et al., supra note 11, at 765.  During the late nineteenth century, England began R
to adopt liberal discovery procedures and English courts expanded the attorney-client privilege
to include materials prepared for trial; this approach influenced some state courts but “had no
impact on the federal courts, which had not yet embraced liberal discovery.” Id. at 766.
26. Subrin, supra note 19, at 692.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 693.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 2072; Subrin, supra note 19, at 691.
30. Subrin, supra note 19, at 691.
31. Id. at 719; Anderson et al., supra note 11, at 766–67. R
32. “If one adds up all of the types of discovery permitted in individual state courts, one finds
some precursors to what later became discovery under the Federal Rules, but . . . no one state
allowed the total panoply of devices” and the FRCP “eliminated features of discovery that in
some states had curtailed the scope of discovery and the breadth of its use.”  8 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 13, § 2001. See also id., § 2002 (“Civil Rules 26 to 37 were intended to take
the best of what were then modern English and state practices for discovery and make them
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Overnight, discovery became the primary means of formulating is-
sues and developing facts.33  It promoted finding truth and eliminated
“the old procedural elements of concealment and surprise.”34  Previ-
ously, pretrial inquiry into issues and facts was narrowly confined and
cumbersome; but now pleadings and discovery provided means to find
facts, and to narrow and clarify issues.35  “Thus civil trials in the fed-
eral courts no longer need be carried on in the dark. The way is now
clear, consistent with recognized privileges, for the parties to obtain
the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.”36
Between the birth of the FRCP in 1938 and the Supreme Court’s
1947 decision in Hickman v. Taylor, district courts addressed the con-
cept of work product protection but often with little clarity or consis-
tency.  In short, the law of this fledging unnamed doctrine was cloudy
and inconsistent.37
On the one hand, several courts held “matters obtained or prepared
as the result of an investigation in anticipation of litigation or in prep-
aration for trial are generally subject to discovery.”38  After all, the
FRCP did not protect this material.  While some complained the new
“hospitality to pre-trial discovery . . . engendered fraud and perjury,”
there was “perjury and coaching of witnesses in the old days” too.39
Others saw unfairness when “a lawyer who . . . diligently prepared his
case [was] obliged to let counsel for the adversary scrutinize his
data.”40  Opponents countered that such unfairness was outweighed
by the “much-needed improvement in judicial ascertainment of the
‘facts’ of cases.”41
available in the federal court.”); Subrin, supra note 19, at 719; Anderson et al., supra note 11, at R
766–67.
33. Anderson et al., supra note 11, at 765. R
34. Stark v. American Dredging Co., 3 F.R.D. 300 (E.D. Pa. 1943) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). See also 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2001 (discussing purpose of
FRCP); Alexander Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
41 MICH. L. REV. 205, 205–08, 210, 213 (1942-1943) (discussing purpose and new mechanisms of
FRCP).
35. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1947).
36. Id. at 501.
37. FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory committee’s report on proposed 1946 amendment. See also
Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F. 2d 212, 220 n. 13 (3d Cir. 1945).   The Supreme Court would later
observe “a great divergence of views among district courts.”  Hickman, 329 U.S. at 500.
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory committee’s report on proposed 1946 amendment (citing dis-
trict court opinions issued between 1939 and 1945). See also Anderson et al, supra note 11, at R
755–56, 767–68, 768 n. 50 (citing cases).
39. Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 997 (2d Cir. 1942).
40. Id.
41. Id.
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However, many courts, for various reasons, ruled to the contrary
and denied discovery of such information.42  Some courts barred re-
quests as seeking nonmaterial or hearsay evidence.43  Others reasoned
permitting such discovery would be unfair and would “penalize dili-
gence and put a premium on laziness.”44  Still others denied discovery
because the moving party failed to provide a good reason for disclo-
sure, or on the general principle that there is no discovery of another
party’s case preparation.45  Yet another group of courts reached the
same conclusion without articulating any clear reason.46  For example,
one district court remarked that although it interpreted the FRCP lib-
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory committee’s report on proposed 1946 amendment. See Palmer
v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 114 (1943) (holding statements taken outside regular course of busi-
ness were inadmissible and writing “It is, of course, not for us to take these reports out of the
Act if Congress has put them in. But there is nothing in the background of the law on which this
Act was built or in its legislative history which suggests for a moment that the business of prepar-
ing cases for trial should be included”).
43. FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory committee’s report on proposed 1946 amendment (citing dis-
trict court opinions issued between 1939 and 1945).
44. FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory committee’s report on proposed 1946 amendment (citing dis-
trict court opinions issued between 1939 and 1944).
45. FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory committee’s report on proposed 1946 amendment (citing dis-
trict court opinions issued between 1939 and 1944). See also Anderson et al., supra note 11, at R
767–71 & nn. 50–75 (1983) (citing cases appealing to the “good cause” requirement in Rule 34
before ordering document production, and other cases interpreting the FRCP to prohibit discov-
ery of such material even though the rules do not explicitly prohibit its discovery); Farr v. Dela-
ware, L. & W.R. Co., 7 F.R.D. 494, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (permitting production of accident
reports made by officers or employees of party “in the regular course of the performance of his
duty” but denying discovery of “any statement or other information acquired by or through the
direction of counsel after notice of the accident and in furtherance of his preparation for the
defense of the action” as “confidential, unless and until the same is presented to the court for
examination and a specific ruling made with respect thereto”).
46. While Rule 34, which governed motions to produce, contained a requirement that a party
show good cause why documents should be produced, many courts protected attorney investiga-
tions as a broad limitation on all forms of discovery in the federal rules. See, e.g., Courteau v.
Interlake S.S. Co., 1 F.R.D. 525, 526 (W.D. Mich. 1941) (denying motion seeking witness state-
ments taken by defense in preparation for trial as one litigant may not make use of opponent’s
case preparation “except in the most unusual circumstances”); Piorkowski v. Socony Vacuum Oil
Co., 1 F.R.D. 407, 408 (M.D. Pa. 1940) (“While the courts have made every effort to construe the
rules for discovery as liberally as possible in order to permit all parties to obtain a full disclosure
of the facts pertaining to the case, there have been established certain necessary limitations of
the exercise of discovery powers. One of these limitations prevents the securing by one party of
the results of the preparation for trial of another party.”); Byers Theaters, Inc. v. Murphy, 1
F.R.D. 286, 288–89 (W.D. Va. 1940) (“both law and reason dictate that the scope of interrogato-
ries” and the FRCP “were not intended to be made the vehicle through which one litigant could
make use of opponent’s preparation of his case.”); Floridin Co. v. Attapulgus Clay Co., 26 F.
Supp. 968, 973–74 (D. Del. 1939) (“The new Rules of Civil Procedure were not intended to
permit a party to pry into the details of the other party’s preparation for trial.”); McCarthy v.
Palmer, 29 F. Supp. 585, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1939) (prohibiting discovery of “affidavits and similar
materials secured by the other party by independent investigation incident to the preparation of
the case for trial” because while the FRCP were “designed to permit liberal examination and
discovery, they were not intended to be made the vehicle through which one litigant could make
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erally, it frequently “determine[d] how far a party may go in the ex-
amination of a witness” on any non-privileged relevant matter.47  Yet
in the same breath the court confined the ruling “to this particular
case lest it might become the practice to conceal information, which
might otherwise be obtainable, in the inter-office correspondence file,
on the supposition that it would thus not be subject to production.”48
The absence of a dominant and well-reasoned view49 caused im-
mense confusion.  After surveying district court opinions, the Third
Circuit described decisions favoring one outcome as having an “unde-
fined extent and uncertain nature,” while decisions reaching the oppo-
site conclusion were “equally cloudy in definition and limited in
scope.”50  The absence of any appellate guidance further complicated
matters.51
1944 witnessed an attempt at clarity by drafting a codified work
product rule.  The proposed FRCP amendment permitted protective
orders to prevent “inquiry into papers and documents prepared or ob-
tained by the adverse party in the preparation of the case for trial.”52
It did not provide absolute protection, but rather established the
power to deny discovery in certain cases.53  A second draft in 1945
noted the diverging court views, and explained that the main objection
to the 1944 proposal concerned its failure to set a standard on when
such protective orders are appropriate.54  “In apparent despair, the
Committee concluded: ‘If members of the profession can formulate a
general statement of the standard for exercise of discretion, the Com-
mittee will welcome it and give it careful consideration.’”55
Just seven years after the adoption of the FRCP, a federal district
court decided Hickman v. Taylor.  At that time the term “work prod-
uct” did not exist.
use of his opponent’s preparation of his case.  . . .  It is fair to assume that, except in the most
unusual circumstances, no such result was intended.”)
47. French v. Zalstem-Zalessky, 1 F.R.D. 508, 508–09 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (concluding defendant
did not have to produce “the result of its investigations in preparing for trial”).
48. Id.
49. See 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2001 (summarizing various viewpoints); Hick-
man v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500 (1947) (“The importance of the problem, which has engendered
a great divergence of views among district courts, led us to grant certiorari.”); James A. Pike &
John W. Willis, Federal Discovery in Operation, 7 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 303–07 (1939-1940) (sum-
marizing case law); Morrow, supra note 21, at 1152 (reviewing conflicting case law). R
50. Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 221 n.13 (3d Cir. 1945).
51. See id. at 214 n. 2.
52. Anderson et al., supra note 11, at 772. R
53. Id.
54. Id; 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2001.
55. Id.
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B. The Lineage of Hickman v. Taylor
Five seamen died when a tugboat capsized.56  Four days later, the
tugboat company and its insurance carrier hired Mr. Fortenbaugh, an
attorney, to “defend whatever litigation arose from the sinking in [sic]
behalf of both the owners of the tug and the underwriters.”57
Fortenbaugh interviewed and took witness statements from four survi-
vors—all employees of the defendant tugboat company—and others
with relevant information.58  In some cases he made interview
memoranda.59
The plaintiff sued the tugboat company and its owners under fed-
eral law for causing her husband’s death.60  She filed an interrogatory
under FRCP 33 seeking any statements from crewmembers of the
capsized tugboat, or any other vessel “taken in connection with the
towing of the car float and the sinking of the Tug.”61  The interro-
gatory also requested copies of all written witness statements, and the
details of any oral statements.62  Later interrogatories sought the in-
terview memoranda.63  The defendants objected because the material
was “privileged matter obtained in preparation for litigation.”64
As this case moved through the court system, so too did issues that
plagued courts for generations.  On its face, the FRCP permitted dis-
covery of this material.65  Some courts disagreed, but lacked any gui-
dance from a statute, rule, or case law.66  The name, source, scope,
and classification of this infant doctrine were rarely addressed with
detail or certainty.
1. District Court Decision
The district court, sitting en banc, ordered production of (i) all writ-
ten witness statements, (ii) the substance of any relevant facts learned
through oral witness statements, and (iii) memoranda of witness inter-
views containing facts.67  In doing so it highlighted core tenants of
what became the work product doctrine.
56. Hickman v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479, 480 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
57. Id. at 481.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 480.
61. Id.
62. Hickman v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479, 480 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
63. Id. at 480–81.
64. Id.
65. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text.
67. Hickman v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479, 480 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
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The district court framed the issue as whether a party “should be
required to produce written statements of witnesses and memoranda
of oral statements . . . made to the party’s attorney.”68  Note that the
court did not frame the issue as an interpretation of the FRCP.  In-
deed, no one contested, nor did the court decide, the propriety of
seeking this information under other rules.  Rather, the decision ap-
plied to all forms of discovery.69  This framing established both that no
particular rule governed the issue (at least not at that time), and that
the issue pervaded the entire code.70
The court held the decision rested on its discretion, reasoning that
the FRCP gives trial courts “the widest discretion” to determine the
discoverability of witness statements to an investigating party.71  The
“guiding principle” of this discretion is that the FRCP supports dis-
covery of all relevant matters “to the fullest extent consistent with the
orderly and efficient functioning of the judicial process.”72
The court went on to overturn its prior decision, and instead held it
will strongly favor discovery in the absence of compelling reasons to
the contrary.73  “Unless, under the circumstances of any particular
case, the Court is satisfied that the administration of justice will be in
some way impeded, discovery will be granted when asked.”74  There-
fore, “even the fact that the chief purpose of taking [the notes] was to
prepare for litigation” does not immunize the material from
discovery.75
But the end of the opinion strikes a different chord.  Despite lan-
guage favoring broad discovery, the court drew a firm distinction be-
tween facts and opinions.  For oral witness statements, the court
ordered disclosures of fact statements, but not opinion statements.76
For witness interview memoranda, the court ordered their production
if they “consist of mere statements of fact” as they are then “in all
respects equivalent to unsigned statements by the witnesses and are in
no different category than the signed statements.”77  However, the
68. Id. at 481.
69. Id. at 481.
70. The Court distinguished the issue from the attorney-client privilege: “What has been said
has to do with the Court’s discretion. The question of privileged communications between attor-
ney and client is another matter and is governed by rules of law.” Id. at 482.
71. Id. at 481.
72. Id. (The only limitations are the requirement to show good cause for a deposition and
certain discovery would not “promote the administration of justice in the particular case”).
73. Hickman v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479, 481 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
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court ordered Fortenbaugh to turn over to the court memoranda con-
taining “notations of mental impressions, opinions, legal theories or
other collateral matter;” the court would review them and disclose
only the portions containing fact statements.78  It reasoned
“[d]iscovery should not be abused to become an instrument for ob-
taining knowledge of the opponent’s theories of the case or the opin-
ions, impressions or the record of mental operations of his attorney.
. . . [F]reedom in preparation for trial of a disputed issue under our
judicial system contributes to satisfactory results, and there cannot be
such freedom without some assurance of privacy within reasonable
limits.”79
2. Third Circuit Decision
Loyal to their convictions, Mr. Fortenbaugh and his clients refused
to turn over the documents and were found guilty of criminal con-
tempt.80  On appeal the Third Circuit, also sitting en banc, admitted
candidly that the “case tests the limits, if any, of the scope of the dis-
covery procedure under the Federal Rules.”81  The Third Circuit also
highlighted other unique difficulties: the FRCP did not “expressly
cover” the issue,82 the district courts were split,83 and the FRCP Advi-
sory Committee never reached a consensus or formulated a workable
standard.84   Ultimately, the court overturned the district court and
held this “work product” material was protected as a public policy
extension of the attorney-client privilege.85
To reach this holding the court relied on a few premises.  First, the
FRCP “intended to go far in making information known by one party
available to the other.”86  Second, there is no meaningful distinction
between oral and written statements.87  Lastly, the policies of the
FRCP bound the courts: “When such a policy has been adopted either
by rule-making court or legislature judges should go along with it.”88
Each of these premises supported broad, liberal discovery—the hall-
mark of the FRCP movement.
78. Id. at 482–83.
79. Hickman v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479, 482 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
80. Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 214 (3d Cir. 1945).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 220.
83. Id.
84. The Committee stated adversary “files and their contents are not absolutely privileged . . .
[but cannot] be delved into in every case without restriction.” Id. at 220 & n.12.
85. Id. at 223.
86. Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 217 (3d Cir. 1945).
87. Id. at 219.
88. Id.
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Despite these premises, the court expressed deep concern over how
this issue affected the attorney-client privilege.  All discovery rules are
subject to and limited by the attorney-client privilege, regardless of
whether the rules contain such an express limitation.89  “[W]e cannot
think a rule as old as that of [the attorney-client] privilege is to be
lightly thrown overboard.”90  But the testimonial attorney-client privi-
lege did not apply to discovery.91  Nonetheless, the material at issue
indirectly affected the privilege.  The court worried that if a lawyer
disclosed witness statements made during an investigation and the wit-
ness made an inconsistent statement at trial, the lawyer could be
called to verify the original statement.92  Invoking the ethical code, the
court cited the “professional tradition” that it is “undesirable” for a
lawyer to advocate and testify for a client.93
Next the court drew an innovative distinction.  Drawing on the En-
glish scope of discovery and a handful of district court decisions, the
Third Circuit held the term “privilege” as used in the FRCP is broader
than the term “privilege” in the law of evidence.94  Although it was
clear the material sought was privileged under the FRCP, the Court
struggled to articulate the “phrasing of [its] conclusion.”95  It was wary
to announce that an attorney’s files are “impregnable,” a position that
might preclude discovery of evidence a client gives to an attorney.96
“But here we are dealing with intangible things, the results of the law-
yer’s use of his tongue, his pen, and his head, for his client.  This was
talked about as the ‘work product of the lawyer’ in the argument of
the case.”97
The Third Circuit announced “work product” not as a separate doc-
trine, but rather as a class of material protected by the discovery-ver-
sion of the attorney-client privilege.  The Court justified “this frank
extension of privilege beyond testimonial exclusion” as “a rule of pub-
lic policy, and the policy is to aid people who have lawsuits and pro-
spective lawsuits.”98  This policy encourages clients to make full
disclosures to their attorneys and encourages attorneys to “put their
whole-souled efforts” into the case.99
89. Id. at 221.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 222.
92. Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 219–20 (3d Cir. 1945).
93. Id. at 220.
94. Id. at 222.
95. Id. at 222–23.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 223 (3d Cir. 1945).
99. Id.
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The Third Circuit was in a precarious position. The FRCP was an
infant.  Courts must follow the policies of the FRCP, which favor
broad discovery.  But here no rule governed.  There was no appellate
authority and district courts disagreed.  The traditional formulation of
the attorney-client privilege did not cover work product but there was
a grave concern such discovery could indirectly undermine the privi-
lege.  So the Court drew upon case law, restatements, advisory com-
mittee notes, ethical and evidentiary rules, and English law.  While it
was clear to the court the sought material warranted protection, it
struggled to articulate a standard or basis.  Ultimately, it grafted onto
the FRCP a common-law style public policy extension of the attorney-
client privilege.
3. An Attempted Intervention by the Judicial Conference
A series of very unusual events followed the Third Circuit’s Decem-
ber 1945 decision.  In April the following year, the Supreme Court
denied the petition for a writ of certiorari,100 only to reverse itself and
grant a petition for rehearing and a writ of certiorari one month later
in May 1946.101  The next month the FRCP Advisory Committee pro-
posed an amendment to Rule 30 codifying work product protection.102
While acknowledging several cases aligned with the Third Circuit’s
opinion, the Committee, with one member dissenting, disagreed.103  It
believed the term “privileged” in the FRCP only referred to the testi-
monial attorney-client privilege and did not extend to work prod-
uct.104  The proposed rule read:
The Court shall not order the production or inspection of any writ-
ing obtained or prepared by the adverse party, his attorney, surety,
indemnitor, or agent in anticipation of litigation or in preparation
for trial unless satisfied that denial of production or inspection will
unfairly prejudice the party seeking the production or inspection in
preparing his claim or defense or will cause him undue hardship or
injustice.  No court shall order the production or inspection of any
part of the writing that reflects an attorney’s mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories, or, except as provided in
Rule 35, the conclusions of an expert.105
100. Hickman v. Taylor, 327 U.S. 808 (1946).
101. Hickman v. Taylor, 328 U.S. 876 (1946).
102. FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory committee’s report on proposed 1946 amendment.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Morrow, supra note 20, at 1153 & n. 47–48 (1971); 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13,
§ 2021 (“This proposal was buttressed by an eight–page note canvassing the relevant
authorities.”).
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Interestingly, the proposal bifurcated the doctrine and created two
standards.  It offered qualified protection to the “production or in-
spection” of materials prepared in anticipation of litigation by requir-
ing the moving party to make a showing of unfair prejudice or undue
hardship.106  But it provided absolute protection for materials that re-
flect “an attorney’s mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories, or, except as provided in Rule 35, the conclusions of any ex-
pert.”107  Although the proposal amended Rule 30, which governed
depositions, it applied to all the main discovery mechanisms.108
The Supreme Court rejected the proposal.  Although the Court did
not explain why “it has usually been assumed that the Court preferred
not to deal with the problem by rulemaking, but hoped to contribute
to a resolution of the controversy by its decision in the Hickman
case.”109  On January 13, 1947 the Supreme Court decided Hickman v.
Taylor.110  In doing so it chose to create and develop a doctrine
through its jurisprudence rather than through a codified rule.
4. Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit on different grounds,
yet never explained its authority to create work product protection.
While acknowledging it could decide the case on narrow procedural
grounds because the plaintiff sought discovery under the incorrect
rule,111 the Court addressed the broader issue of whether any discov-
ery devices can include “materials collected by an adverse party’s
counsel in the course of preparation for possible litigation.”112  Again,
the issue pervaded the entire FRCP and no single rule governed.
The Court began by reinforcing the FRCP’s liberal discovery pol-
icy.113  Nonetheless, “discovery, like all matters of procedure, has ulti-
mate and necessary boundaries”—although the Court never identified
the source of these boundaries.114   Guiding the Court was the effect
106. FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory committee’s report on proposed 1946 amendment.  The com-
mittee rejected standards of “fishing expedition,” “penalizes the diligent,” puts a “premium on
laziness,” and a broad attorney-client privilege. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2021.
110. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
111. “But, under the circumstances, we deem it unnecessary and unwise to rest our decision
upon this procedural irregularity, an irregularity which is not strongly urged upon us and which
was disregarded in the two courts below.” Id. at 505.
112. Id. at 504–05.
113. Id. at 507 (“The way is now clear, consistent with recognized privileges, for the parties to
obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.”).
114. Id. at 507.
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an unnecessary intrusion into an attorney’s work would have on the
profession.  The Court emphasized that the plaintiff had other means
of obtaining the witness statements, like by obtaining their prior testi-
mony at a public hearing or by deposing the witnesses directly.115
Thus, there was no showing of necessity or any indication denial of
production would unduly prejudice plaintiff or cause “any hardship or
injustice.”116  Somewhat summarily, the Court held no discovery rule
contemplated the production of such material in these circum-
stances.117  However, this bar was “not because the subject matter is
privileged or irrelevant.”118  Rather, work product protection “falls
outside the arena of discovery and contravenes the public policy un-
derlying the orderly prosecution and defense of legal claims.”119
This public policy is the regulation of the legal profession; specifi-
cally, the role of attorneys and how they can best serve clients.  A
lawyer is “an officer of the court [ ] bound to work for the advance-
ment of justice” while also protecting client interests.120  “It is essen-
tial that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from
unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel.”121
Proper preparation of a case requires assembling information, deter-
mining which facts are relevant, preparing legal theories, and planning
strategy “without undue and needless interference.”122  The term
“work product” covers this kind of work.123  A contrary rule risks
“[i]nefficiency, unfairness, and sharp practices” that would demoralize
the legal profession, and “the interests of the clients and the cause of
justice would be poorly served.”124
Nonetheless, work product protection is qualified.  “Where relevant
and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney’s file, and
where production of those facts is essential to the preparation of one’s
115. Id. at 504.
116. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509 (1947).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 509–10.
119. Id. at 510.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
123. Id.
124. Id. Justices Jackson and Frankfurter, concurring, focused on the necessity of the doctrine
to the legal profession.  “The primary effect of the practice advocated here would be on the legal
profession itself.  But it too often is overlooked that the lawyer and the law office are indispensa-
ble parts of our administration of justice. Id. at 514–15 (Jackson, J., concurring).  “It is true that
the literal language of the Rules would admit of an interpretation that would sustain the district
court’s order. . . . But all such procedural measures have a background of custom and practice
which was assumed by those who wrote and should be by those who apply them.” Id. at 518.
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case, discovery may properly be had.”125  Absolute protection would
undermine the FRCP’s “liberal ideals.”126  The burden of showing ne-
cessity is “implicit in the rules” and rests on the moving party because
“the general policy against invading the privacy of an attorney’s
course of preparation is so well recognized and so essential to an or-
derly working of our system of legal procedure.”127  This burden is
higher to discover “an attorney’s recollection or impressions of oral
witness statements.128
5. The Questions and Answers of Hickman
And so work product was born. Hickman answers some questions
while leaving others unanswered.  For example, the Court affirmed
that work product does not fall within the attorney-client privilege
and is an issue that affects all civil discovery.129  With no rule on point,
it created work product protection in common law fashion based on
“the public policy underlying the orderly prosecution and defense of
legal claims.”130
But the Court did not explain the source of its power to create a
new doctrine out of public policy alone.  Which power the Court re-
lied upon affects the viability of future modifications to, or even the
elimination of, work product protection.
Some language does hint at whether the doctrine can change or
evolve, but does not specify how.  Parts of Hickman suggest work
product protection is necessary to the justice system.  To start, the
125. Id. at 511.
126. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511–12 (1947).
127. Id.
128. While a showing of necessity to access written witness statements is possible, an
equivalent showing to access oral statements is unlikely though not impossible.  “Under ordinary
conditions, forcing an attorney to repeat or write out all that witnesses have told him and to
deliver the account to his adversary gives rise to grave dangers of inaccuracy and untrustworthi-
ness.  No legitimate purpose is served by such production.” Id. at 513.  To force an attorney to
testify what he remembers or what he saw fit to write down “could not qualify as evidence” and
if used for impeachment or corroboration would make the attorney “much less an officer of the
court and much more an ordinary witness. The standards of the profession would thereby suf-
fer.” Id.  But “[i]f there should be a rare situation justifying production of these matters, peti-
tioner’s case is not of that type.” Id.
129. See supra note 112.
130. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947).  As Professor Edward Cleary described it
“The fact seems to be, however, that the Court was once more trapped by an apparently felt
necessity of saving face by refusing to admit that a contingency had arisen which the rules had
not foreseen or had dealt with improvidently. A court driven to critical scrutiny of its own rules
occupies an ambiguous and embarrassing position, with no escape offered by the usual prefer-
ence for judicial over legislative wisdom.” Edward W. Cleary, Hickman v. Jencks Jurisprudence
of the Adversary System, 14 VAND. L. REV. 865, 866 (1960-1961).
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Court held discovery has “ultimate and necessary boundaries.”131
And “[i]t is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of pri-
vacy,” for that “is the historical and the necessary way in which law-
yers act within the framework of our system of jurisprudence to
promote justice and to protect their clients’ interests.”132  Even more
strongly, the Court wrote “[n]ot even the most liberal of discovery
theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files and the mental
impressions of an attorney.”133  Such language paints an outer limit to
discovery.  This language suggests the Court has authority to establish
at least some form of work product protection that the other branches
of government cannot modify or eliminate.
Yet other Hickman language suggests the opposite.  There was
widespread controversy throughout the profession over the issues
raised in Hickman.134  In fact, work product is “one of the most hazy
frontiers of the discovery process.”135  “But, until some rule or statute
definitely prescribes otherwise, we are not justified in permitting dis-
covery in a situation of this nature as a matter of unqualified right . . .
we refuse to interpret the rules at this time so as to reach so harsh and
unwarranted a result.”136  Such statements strongly suggest that either
Congress, or the Supreme Court through its rulemaking power, can
modify or even eliminate work product protection.  Oddly though,
shortly before deciding Hickman, the Supreme Court rejected a pro-
posed rule.137
A close reading of Hickman sets up the overlooked conflict at the
core of work product: who defines and controls work product?
Though most courts and commentators focus only on Hickman’s defi-
nition of work product, the opinion’s language outlines the potential
for modifications. Hickman was an intervention.  Strong policies led
to Hickman because there was no guidance from any other sources.
But the Court carefully included noticeable deference to the FRCP
and acknowledged the potential for a rule-based override.
131. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
132. Id. at 511.
133. Id. at 510.
134. Id. at 513–14.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 514.
137. Supra notes 102–109 and accompanying text.
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C. The Aftermath of Hickman v. Taylor
1. Immediate Response
Hickman did not settle matters or bring peace to this turbulent area
of law.  Work product was brand new, with no clear backstory and
many moving parts.  Disagreement was inevitable. Although designed
to simplify procedure, as one judge explained, the FRCP has “been
the subject of more interpretive legal literature than almost any
branch of the law during my judicial tenure; and more particularly did
the case of Hickman v. Taylor account for a large part of it—a verita-
ble Pandora’s Box!”138
The confusion never subsided.  Courts did not reach consensus.
One significant source of confusion was whether Hickman applied to
non-attorney work product.  Because Hickman involved an attorney
and emphasized the special role of attorneys in the legal system, many
courts limited protection to attorney-created work product.139 Other
courts disagreed, finding “no logical basis” for distinguishing witness
statements gathered by non-attorneys for attorneys.140  Similarly,
questions arose about what legal skills triggered protection and
whether expert materials received protection.141
These questions were the tip of the iceberg.  Courts disagreed about
the burden of overcoming work product protection.142  Many courts
interpreted Hickman’s burden to be higher than the “good cause” re-
quirement under Rule 34 to produce documents, while others treated
the two standards as equivalent.143 Others questioned whether protec-
138. Viront v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co., 10 F.R.D. 45 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
139. Anderson et al., supra note 11, at 780 & n. 133 (citing cases); FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory R
committee’s note to 1970 amendment (citing cases); Cleary, supra note 130, 867–69 (discussing R
cases).
140. Anderson et al., supra note 11, at 780 & n.134; FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s R
note to 1970 amendment (citing cases).
141. Morrow, supra note 20, at 1157.
142. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment; 8 WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 13, § 2025.
143. Anderson et al., supra note 11, at 780–81; FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note R
to 1970 amendment. Accord Morrow, supra note 20, at 1157 (“First, Hickman left three ‘good
cause’ burdens to be met before discovery could be used: (1) good cause (relevance) for produc-
tion of documents under rule 34; (2) good cause (hardship or necessity) to discover ordinary
work-product; and (3) good cause (a ‘rare case’) to discover an attorney’s mental impressions-a
test which the Court did not even attempt to define. The situation was distressing, as courts in
the years after Hickman became confused and equated the good cause for work-product with a
showing of relevance, dearly an erroneous interpretation of the meaning of Hickman.”). See
also Notes, Discovery: Work Product and Good Cause Development Since Hickman v. Taylor, 36
IND. L.J. 186, 195–200 (1960-1961).
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tion applied beyond discovery to trials.144  Even the FRCP Advisory
Committee acknowledged the immense confusion: “Some of the most
controversial and vexing problems to emerge from the discovery rules
have arisen out of requests for the production of documents or things
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.”145
In part due to these issues, many states otherwise adopting the fed-
eral discovery rules drafted their own detailed work product rule to
solve the problems left open in Hickman.146  But the federal system
was slow to act.  For nearly two decades, proposed FRCP amend-
ments in 1953, 1955, and 1967 tried to clarify the burden to overcome
work product protection.  None succeeded.147
Finally, everything changed in 1970.  While acknowledging the Su-
preme Court’s 1947 preference to solve the problem by judicial deci-
sion rather than by rule, the FRCP Advisory Committee felt
“[s]ufficient experience has accumulated” with lower court applica-
tions of Hickman to warrant a “reappraisal” in the form of a codified
rule.148
The 1970 amendment created FRCP 26(b)(3), which has not been
significantly changed since then, and today reads:
(3) Trial Preparation: Materials.
(A) Documents and Tangible Things. Ordinarily, a party may
not discover documents and tangible things that are pre-
pared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for an-
other party or its representative (including the other
party’s attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or
agent). But, subject to Rule 26(b)(4), those materials may
be discovered if:
(i) they are otherwise discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1);
and
(ii) the party shows that it has substantial need for the
materials to prepare its case and cannot, without undue
hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other
means.
(B) Protection Against Disclosure. If the court orders discov-
ery of those materials, it must protect against disclosure of
the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal the-
144. Edward W. Cleary, Hickman v. Jencks Jurisprudence of the Adversary System, 14 VAND.
L. REV. 865, 870 (1960-1961).
145. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment.
146. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2022.
147. Anderson et al., supra note 11, at 782–84; Morrow, supra note 20, at 1160; 8 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 13, § 2023.
148. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment.  For a history of the
1970 amendments see Morrow, supra note 20, at 1157–63.
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ories of a party’s attorney or other representative concern-
ing the litigation.149
The Rule eliminated confusion by replacing the “good cause” require-
ment with a “substantial need” and “undue burden” standard.  The
committee elaborated that “substantial need” requires an assessment
of importance, need, and alternative access.150   The amendment also
resolved whose work product was protected by extending protection
to non-attorneys.151
But at the same time Rule 26 raised many new debates, perhaps
even more than it solved.  The Rule gave special protection to an at-
torney’s “mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories”
(sometimes referred to as “opinion” or “core” work product).  Yet the
rule only protects “tangible things.”  Was intangible work product still
protected?  If so, was it subject to a different standard?  Commenta-
tors disagreed.152  While Hickman “soundly divided the subject into
‘ordinary’ and ‘opinion’ work product,”
Rule 26(b)(3) surprisingly, irrelevantly, and apparently inadver-
tently divided the same world into “tangible” and “intangible” work
product.  The rule implicitly recognized that both ordinary and
opinion work product, deserving different degrees of protection,
could appear in documents and tangible things.  The rule left intan-
gible work product on its own.153
As one set of commentators noted this “suggested the existence of
some ill-defined bifurcation within the rule.”154  Why Rule 26 did not
mimic the language of Hickman is a question left unanswered.  Simi-
larly, what justifies this distinction between tangible and intangible
work product?  Why is intangible work product left unprotected?
These are issues rarely raised and never answered.
The Rule also limited protection to materials prepared “in anticipa-
tion of litigation.”  This created a new and problematic sub-doctrine.
When does “anticipation” begin?  Does protection extend beyond the
anticipated litigation to subsequent litigation?155  Other issues arose
concerning waiver and which parties could assert the protection.156
149. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3); 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2023.
150. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment.
151. Anderson et al., supra note 11, at 782–84.
152. Id.
153. Clermont, supra note 18, at 756.
154. Anderson et al., supra note 11, at 782–84.
155. Id. at 784.
156. Id.
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The 1974 amendments to Rules 16(a)(2) and (b)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure added work product protection in crimi-
nal cases.  They currently state:
(a)(2) Information Not Subject to Disclosure. Except as permitted
by Rule 16(a)(1)(A)-(D), (F), and (G), this rule does not au-
thorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda,
or other internal government documents made by an attor-
ney for the government or other government agent in con-
nection with investigating or prosecuting the case.  Nor does
this rule authorize the discovery or inspection of statements
made by prospective government witnesses except as pro-
vided in 18 U.S.C. §3500.
. . .
(b)(2) Information Not Subject to Disclosure. Except for scientific
or medical reports, Rule 16(b)(1) does not authorize discov-
ery or inspection of:
(A) reports, memoranda, or other documents made by the
defendant, or the defendant’s attorney or agent, during the
case’s investigation or defense; or
(B) a statement made to the defendant, or the defendant’s
attorney or agent, by:
(i) the defendant;
(ii) a government or defense witness; or
(iii) a prospective government or defense witness.157
Yet again, for reasons unknown, work product’s allergy to consistency
flared.  Rule 16’s language neither mirrors Hickman nor FRCP 26.
Unlike its civil counterpart it is “cast in terms of the type of document
involved (e.g., report), rather than in terms of the content (e.g., legal
theory).”158  The amendment process rejected altering the language to
mirror its civil counterpart.159
Thus, the time period after the 1970 and 1974 amendments re-
mained filled with disputes and conflicting opinions.160  By at least one
estimate, work product “is the most frequently litigated discovery
issue.”161
2. Modern Interpretation of the Work Product Doctrine
This Article has tracked work product chronologically to reach con-
clusions about its source and nature.  At this point let us pause and
take inventory.  Professor Clermont summarized it well:
157. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(2).
158. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a) advisory committee’s note to 1974 amendment.
159. Id.
160. Anderson et al., supra note 11, at 782–84.  For a comprehensive study of the dilemmas in
applying the codified rules see Anderson et al., supra note 11.
161. Id. at 763.
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Significant intellectual challenge and truly compelling importance
compose the formula for disorder.  So many commentators (and
judges) wander into the moraine, focus hard but myopically on
some tiny facet of the work-product doctrine, and leave a deposit of
fresh confusion.  One of the contributing causes of this disorder is
the questionable legal process that produced the work-product doc-
trine.  In the forties, the Supreme Court passed up the rulemaking
route for the pointillist case method, kicking off the process of clari-
fication with the great case of Hickman v. Taylor.  In 1970, from the
welter of conflicting decisions the rulemakers attempted to codify
workable sensibleness, adopting the poorly executed Rule 26(b)(3).
Today we thus enjoy intensified confusion.162
Even putting aside the interpretations of FRCP 26, Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 16, and Hickman, there is a much larger issue.
That these Rules and Hickman are different in significant ways is well
established.  Take FRCP 26 as an example: “One of the most signifi-
cant features of the current work product doctrine is the coexistence
of Hickman and Rule 26(b)(3).”163  Some view FRCP 26 as narrower
than Hickman because it applies only to tangible work product, while
Hickman also protects intangible work product.164  But others note
FRCP 26 is broader than Hickman in that it protects non-attorney
work product whereas Hickman only discusses attorney work prod-
uct.165  Moreover, FRCP 26 is subject to the methods of interpretation
that apply to federal rules, whereas Hickman is a policy-driven analy-
sis.166  Yet all survive as governing sources of law.
Commentators conclude that FRCP 26(b)(3) embodies the “partial
codification” of Hickman v. Taylor.167  But this is more than academic
theory.  The Supreme Court has admitted this too: “The ‘strong public
policy’ underlying the work-product doctrine . . . has been substan-
tially incorporated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3).”168
Consistently federal courts follow suit, holding Rule 26 “partially”
codifies work product protection and Hickman governs uncodified in-
tangible work product.169  Yet no courts have explained why or identi-
162. Clermont, supra note 18, at 755–56.




167. See, e.g., Anderson et al., supra note 11, at 762, 784.
168. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 398 (1981) (emphasis added).
169. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, §§ 2023–24 (“[T]he preexisting protections for in-
tangible work product have continued application despite the 1970 amendment.”) (citing cases).
See, e.g., United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Hickman provides
work-product protection for intangible work product independent of Rule 26(b)(3).”); In re
Cendent Corp. Secs. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 662 (3d Cir. 2003) (“It is clear from Hickman that work
product protection extends to both tangible and intangible work product.”); United States v.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\67-1\DPL102.txt unknown Seq: 23  5-JAN-18 15:08
2017] UNCERTAIN FOUNDATION OF WORK PRODUCT 57
fied authority for ruling as such.  After all, Hickman instructed it
governs “until some rule or statute definitely prescribes otherwise.”170
Now there are rules.  So why is Hickman still relevant?
Currently there are, effectively, two work product doctrines: a codi-
fied branch and a Hickman branch.  The implications are significant.
Consider the question of whether protection extends to a non-party’s
work product.  Rule 26 provides no protection.  If that is the only
source of work product protection, a non-party must seek a protective
order under another provision.171  But if Rule 26 is a partial codifica-
tion of Hickman, then a court can “continue to apply the Hickman
policies to resolve questions which the Rule does not address.”172
More fundamentally, which source governs the issue?  Do courts look
to the Rule, to Hickman, or to both?
III. ANALYSIS
Courts, practitioners, and commentators have erred in focusing
nearly exclusively on Hickman for answers.  The decision is only par-
tially instructive.  The full spectrum of Supreme Court decisions about
work product, coupled with an analysis of federal rulemaking power,
provides answers.  The Hickman work product doctrine is the product
of federal courts’ inherent rulemaking power and is far more expan-
sive than previously thought.  But it is not limitless.  If a rule or statute
applies, it preempts Hickman.
One Tract of Real Property Together With all Bldgs., Improvements, Appurtenances and Fix-
tures, 95 F.3d 422, 428 n.10 (6th Cir. 1996) (“When applying the work product privilege to such
nontangible information, the principles enunciated in Hickman apply, as opposed to Rule
26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which applies only to ‘documents and tangible
things.’”); Alexander v. FBI, 192 F.R.D. 12, 17 (D.D.C. 2000) (“To analyze an attorney work-
product claim as to intangible work product, courts must look to the caselaw under Hickman v.
Taylor . . . and its progeny and not to FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3), which applies only to ‘documents
and tangible things.’”); Lopes v. Vieira, 688 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1069 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (“The work-
product privilege was substantially incorporated into F.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3)(A).”); Byers v.
Burleson, 100 F.R.D. 436, 439 n.4 (D.D.C. 1983) (same); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Legal
Servs. Ctr.), 615 F. Supp. 958, 963 (D. Mass. 1985) (same); Donovan v. Fitzsimmons, 90 F.R.D.
583, 587 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (same); Loftis v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 175 F.R.D. 5, 11 (D. Conn. 1997)
(same).
170. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 514 (1947).
171. Anderson et al., supra note 11, at 861–64.
172. Id. at 862.
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A. Hickman Remains Good Law But is Much More Than
a Discovery Doctrine
Despite the confusion rampant within this crucial doctrine, the Su-
preme Court has rarely discussed Hickman.173  In fact, the Court
never squarely addressed the doctrine between Hickman and the
amendments to FRCP 26 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.
Some later opinions refer to work product in passing and without
elaboration; they simply reaffirm its general definition.174
173. The Supreme Court has used the term “work product” to refer to many different con-
cepts.  In many cases the Court uses the term in a more descriptive or colloquial manner refer-
ring to the product or output of government entities or professionals.  Such cases seem to have
no bearing on the work product protection discussed here. See, e.g., Montanile v. Bd. of Trs. of
Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health Benefit Plan, 136 S. Ct. 651 (2016) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“the
Court erred profoundly in that case by reading the work product of a Congress sitting in 1974 as
. . . .”); Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2481 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“For another thing, the FDA has set forth its positions only in briefs filed in litigation, not in
regulations, interpretations, or similar agency work product.”); Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 99
(2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“the improvidence of our grant provides an additional reason
why we should not vacate the work product of our colleagues on the Court of Appeals.”); Rapa-
nos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 788 (2006) (“Our unanimous decision . . . was faithful to our
duty to respect the work product of the Legislative and Executive Branches of our Govern-
ment.”); Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 76 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(“In recent years the Court has suggested that we should only look at legislative history for the
purpose of resolving textual ambiguities or to avoid absurdities. It would be wiser to acknowl-
edge that it is always appropriate to consider all available evidence of Congress’ true intent when
interpreting its work product.”); Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 467 (2002) (“If
we assume that Senators Rockefeller and Wallop correctly understood their work product, the
provision is coherent.”) (referring to statements in Congressional Record); Cent. State Univ. v.
Am. Asso. of Univ. Professors, 526 U.S. 124, 130 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to the
“work product of faculty members in Ohio’s several state universities”); McIntyre v. Ohio Elec-
tions Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341 (1995) (“[T]he anonymity of an author is not ordinarily a suffi-
cient reason to exclude her work product from the protections of the First Amendment”);
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 486 (1989) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (“But when our earlier opinion gives a statutory provision concrete meaning, which
Congress elects not to amend during the ensuing 3 1/2 decades, our duty to respect Congress’
work product is strikingly similar to the duty of other federal courts to respect our work prod-
uct.”); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821–22 (1988) (“In performing that task, the Court
has reviewed the work product of state legislatures and sentencing juries, and has carefully con-
sidered the reasons why a civilized society may accept or reject the death penalty in certain types
of cases.”).
174. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006) (involving assistant district attor-
ney’s internal memorandum assessing a law enforcement affidavit and concluding “government
employees’ work product” was not protected speech); Dept. of Interior v. Klamath Water Users
Protective Assn., 532 U.S. 1, 8 (2001) (concluding FOIA provision incorporating civil discovery
privileges included “the privilege for attorney work-product and what is sometimes called the
‘deliberative process’ privilege. Work product protects mental processes of the attorney. . .while
deliberative process covers documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and delib-
erations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formu-
lated.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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Complicating matters, courts have referred to work product using
different terms,175 including “qualified privilege,”176 “work product
privilege,”177 and “work-product immunity.”178  Courts are clear work
product is not an evidentiary privilege,179 but it may be a form of im-
munity or a “qualified privilege.”180  While some might dismiss the
naming as semantics, its nomenclature is part of the problem.  FRCP
26 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 address work product
in the discovery context.  But “immunity” carries connotations of trial
protection while “privilege” suggests protection extending throughout
all phases of a case.  Fortunately, later Supreme Court decisions shed
light on its scope.
Decided over two decades after Hickman, the 1975 criminal case of
United States v. Nobles transformed the Hickman work product doc-
trine.  In Nobles, the defense called one of its investigators to discuss
what prosecution witnesses told him.181  But the trial court condi-
tioned the testimony on disclosure of the investigator’s written report,
which was work product.182  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16
protected work product but only applied to pretrial discovery.183  The
Court concluded while work product protection applied, the defense
waived this “qualified privilege” when it called the investigator.184  In
doing so, the Court issued its clearest holding on Hickman work
product.
Nobles explicitly disproved several work product classifications and
limits.  First, the policies of Hickman apply to criminal trials; in fact,
“its role in assuring the proper functioning of the criminal justice sys-
tem is even more vital.”185  Second, the Court identified “core” work
175. See also Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55, 58 n.1 (N.D. Ohio
1953) (“The term, ‘work product of the attorney’ has been variously characterized a ‘privilege,’
‘exemption,’ or ‘immunity.’ It matters little what terminology is employed, however, so long as it
is understood that the phrase encompasses something apart from confidential communications
between client and attorney.”).
176. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 183 (1979) (“We have in the past, however,
recognized evidentiary privileges in order to protect interests and relationships . . . For example,
Hickman v. Taylor, supra, created a qualified privilege for attorneys’ work products in part be-
cause, without such a privilege, [t]he effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing.”)
(internal quotations omitted).
177. FTC v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19 (1983).
178. Id. at 24.
179. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2023.
180. Id.
181. 422 U.S. 225, 227 (1975).
182. Id.at 229.
183. Id. at 235–36.
184. Id. at 239.
185. Id. at 238.
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product (impliedly distinguishing “periphery” work product): “At its
core, the work product doctrine shelters the mental processes of the
attorney, providing a privileged area within which he can analyze and
prepare his client’s case.”186  Crucially, the Court defined this “core”
without discussing whether such material is tangible or intangible.
Third, acknowledging the post-Hickman confusion, the Court held
protection applies to non-attorneys, noting that “the doctrine is an in-
tensely practical one.”187 Nobles thereby disproved those sources that
described FRCP 26 as broader than Hickman because it applied to
non-attorneys.188  Fourth, the Court held that protection extends be-
yond discovery to the trial phase of a case (and potentially onward).189
The driving forces leading to codification thought of work product as
a discovery doctrine.190  No more.191
Notably, Nobles’ context is similar to Hickman.  Because Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 only covered pretrial discovery, no
rule governed the trial issue in Nobles.   Yet again the Court called
upon the public policies of Hickman, but again it did not explain its
authority to do so.192  The Court referenced the “federal judiciary’s
inherent power” to require the prosecution to produce statements of
its witnesses to the defense,193 but never specified its authority to de-
fine and expand the Hickman work product doctrine.
Nonetheless, the precise scope of Hickman/Nobles remains unclear.
FTC v. Grolier Inc. illustrates the ambiguity of their breadth.  In Gro-
lier, the Supreme Court held civil work product protection extended
beyond the specific litigation the attorney prepared the materials
186. Id. at 238.
187. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238–39 & n.13 (1975).
188. See supra note 164.
189. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975). Cf. Swidler & Berlin v. United States,
524 U.S. 399, 415 (1998) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (concluding the work product doctrine does
not apply “where the material concerns a client who is no longer a potential party to adversarial
litigation”).
190. In fact, the main dispute raised in the concurring opinion of Justice White is whether
Hickman is limited to pretrial discovery.  United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 243 (1975).
Justice White described the Hickman decision “entirely as one involving the plaintiff’s entitle-
ment to pretrial discovery under the new Federal Rules.” Id. at 244 (White, J., concurring).  He
concluded the Hickman court did not conclude that work product fell within the attorney-client
privilege (as the Third Circuit had concluded) because doing so would have prevented work
product serving as evidence at trial. Id.at 245. Justice White noted Congress passed Rule 26
“which incorporated much of” Hickman. Id. at 246. He went on to assert the public policy in
Hickman does not apply, or at least is not nearly as strong, in the evidentiary context. Id. at 254.
191. The Court would not “undertake here to delineate the scope of the doctrine at trial.” Id.
at 239.
192. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236–38 (1975).
193. Id. at 231.
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for.194  The Freedom of Information Act required making agency
materials available to the public; however, an exception excluded
materials not available “by law” to a party in litigation with the
agency.195  The question was “the extent, if any, to which the work
product component of [the exemption] applies when the litigation for
which the requested documents were generated has been termi-
nated.”196  To reach its conclusion, the Court relied on the text of Rule
26, which protected materials prepared for any litigation “as long as
they were prepared by or for a party to the subsequent litigation.”197
“Whatever problems such a construction of Rule 26(b)(3) may engen-
der in the civil discovery area, it provides a satisfactory resolution to
the question whether work-product documents are exempt under the
FOIA.”198
Noticeably absent from the majority opinion is any discussion of
Hickman/Nobles policies.  One explanation is that because a rule gov-
erns there is no need to appeal to public policy.  Another explanation
is that Rule 26 is broader than the Hickman/Nobles doctrine and so
these policies did not apply.  Yet, concurring, Justice Brennan drew
upon these policies: “A contrary interpretation such as that adopted
by the Court of Appeals would work substantial harm to the policies
that the doctrine is designed to serve and protect.”199  Citing Hick-
man, he warned against the “demoralizing effect on the profession,”
“harm to the interests of the attorney and his client,” and the “danger
of inefficiency, unfairness, [and] sharp practices.”200
Nobles extended Hickman dramatically, but Grolier laid out a po-
tentially important clarification.  In light of Grolier, a court’s first stop
may be to carefully assess any codified work product rules or statutory
limitations on the doctrine.  If those sources do not address the issue,
only then does a court look to the public policies of Hickman.   Still,
courts have never endorsed a regimented two-step process and the
answer remains unclear.201
194. 462 U.S. 19, 28 (1983).
195. Id. at 20.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 25.
198. Id. at 25–26 (citations omitted).
199. Id. at 29.
200. FTC v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 30–31.
201. In its 1996 decision in United States v. Armstrong the Supreme Court held Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(C) “authorizes defendants to examine Government documents
material to the preparation of their defense against the Governments case in chief, but not to the
preparation of selective-prosecution claims.” 517 U.S. 456, 463 (1996).  Concurring, Justice
Breyer argued the majority inferred a “case in chief” limitation in part because the defense
would likely need work product to make its case for a selective-prosecution claim and a different
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B. Federal Courts Apply Hickman Through Their Inherent Power
to Create Rules
The Supreme Court’s authority to decide Hickman/Nobles is un-
known.  Also unknown is the authority for federal courts to apply
Hickman policy considerations to supplement codified rules.  The an-
swer is the firmly established, rarely invoked, nebulous inherent pow-
ers of federal courts.
1. The Federal Rulemaking Process
The primary way federal rules, like the rules of civil, criminal, and
appellate procedure, are created is through a congressional delegation
of rulemaking power to the judiciary via the Rules Enabling Act.  The
Act permits the Supreme Court to create “general rules of practice
and procedure and rules of evidence” for cases in federal courts.202  To
assist with the rulemaking process, Congress created the Judicial Con-
ference to draft proposed rules and amendments.203  Although the Ju-
dicial Conference plays a significant practical role, the power to issue
new rules remains solely with the Court.  The Supreme Court has re-
jected,204 modified,205 and taken no action206 on proposed rules.  The
Court must submit all proposed amendments for congressional re-
view.  When Congress elects not to intervene, the proposals take
effect.207
There are several statutory limits on this rulemaking process.  First,
no proposed rules can “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
provision of Rule 16 prevented disclosure of work product. Id. at 473.  But the work product
provision may itself contain an implicit exception as it does not offer absolute protection. Id. at
473-74. “Of course, to read the work-product exception as containing some such implicit excep-
tion itself represents a departure from the Rule’s literal language. But, is it not far easier to
believe the Rule’s authors intended some such small implicit exception to an exception, consis-
tent with the language and purpose of the Rule, than that they intended the very large exception
created by the Court?” Id. at 474.
202. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012).  Congress has also authorized the Supreme Court and all
federal courts to create internal “rules for the conduct of their business” (i.e. local rules) so long
as such rules are “consistent with Acts of Congress” and rules passed via the Rules Enabling
Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2012).
203. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012).
204. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 54, 100 (1977)
(court rejected proposed work product rule because of pending case).
205. See 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE: CIVIL § 1004 (3d ed. 2008) (Supreme Court made changes to first proposed set of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); WINIFRED R. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS
AND POSSIBILITIES, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 13–15, 31 (1981).
206. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 205, § 1006 (referencing 1955 rule proposals); Stephen
B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L.
REV. 841, 843 (1993) (Court refused to transmit amendment implicating foreign relations).
207. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (2012).
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right.”208  Notably, unlike the attorney-client privilege, the work prod-
uct doctrine is procedural and thus always governed by federal law
even when a federal court decides a case under diversity jurisdic-
tion.209  Second, if “laws” and a rule conflict, the more recent one
prevails.210 Research revealed no cases deciding whether “laws” in-
cludes case law such that a rule supersedes a conflicting court decision
(like Hickman).  Third, any proposed rule “creating, abolishing, or
modifying an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless
approved by Act of Congress.”211  Although sometimes referred to as
a “qualified privilege,” work product is not an evidentiary privilege.212
But, muddying the waters, Congress, not the Supreme Court, enacted
Federal Rule of Evidence 502, which outlines the subject matter
waiver of both the attorney-client privilege and work product.213
This process assumes Congress controls federal court procedure and
may delegate such power to the judiciary.  Courts agree that with
Congress’s power to create inferior courts comes the ability to control
the procedure of such courts.214  As the Supreme Court has explained,
“Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and proce-
dure of federal courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to
this or other federal courts authority to make rules not inconsistent
with the statutes or Constitution of the United States.”215
208. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a), (b).
209. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2023 (“At least since the adoption of Rule
26(b)(3) in 1970, it has been clear that in federal court the question whether material is protected
as work product is governed by federal law even if the case is in federal court solely on grounds
of diversity of citizenship.”). See e.g., In re Powerhouse Licensing, LLC, 441 F.3d 467, 472 (6th
Cir. 2006) (“In a diversity case, the court applies federal law to resolve work product claims and
state law to resolve attorney-client claims”); Baker v. GM, 209 F.3d 1051, 1053 (8th Cir. 2000)
(same); Frontier Refining, Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., 136 F.3d 695, 703 n. 10 (10th Cir. 1998)
(same); United Coal Cos. v. Powell Constr. Co., 839 F.2d 958, 966 (3d Cir. 1988) (“Unlike the
attorney client privilege, the work product privilege is governed, even in diversity cases, by a
uniform federal standard embodied in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). . ..”).
210. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012); United States v. Wilson, 306 F.3d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 2002)
(finding rule of appellate procedure abrogates or abolishes conflicting federal statute); United
States v. Kim, 298 F.3d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 2002) (same).
211. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b).
212. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2023.
213. FED R. EVID. 502; Pub. L. No. 110-322, §1(a) (2008).
214. Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. 632, 656 (1835) (“And that the power to ordain and establish,
carries with it the power to prescribe and regulate the modes of proceeding in such courts, ad-
mits of as little doubt.”); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 206, § 1001 (“The whole history of
federal judicial procedure, the submission of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
amendments thereto to Congress in accordance with the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, and the
decisions of the Supreme Court, all are premised on the authority of Congress to make procedu-
ral rules and to delegate that power to the Supreme Court.”).
215. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1941).
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2. The Equally Well-Established Yet Amorphous Inherent Powers
of Federal Courts to Create Rules
What if the federal rules are silent on an issue?  What if neither
Congress nor the Supreme Court have used their rulemaking power to
address an issue?  This was the scenario in Hickman and this is where
the concept of inherent powers comes into play.
In Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc.,216 the Third Circuit explained that
federal courts have inherent powers to create procedural rules.217
“That the Federal courts have power, or may be empowered, to make
rules of procedure for the conduct of litigation has been settled for a
century.”218  These inherent powers are “vested in the courts upon
their creation” and “not derived from any statute.”219  They range
from creating rules regulating attorney conduct to rules for managing
a court’s docket.220  Examples include the power to hold people in
contempt, dismiss a case for failure to prosecute, reprimand attorneys,
and tax costs on appeal.221  While the use of these powers is rare and
rife with “conceptual and definitional problems” that have “bedeviled
commentators for years,” the Eash court identified three distinct types
of inherent powers.222
One type is an inherent power to create useful rules, the “Useful
Rules Power.”223  For example, in In re Peterson, the Supreme Court
upheld a district court’s power to appoint an auditor to assist its un-
derstanding of the case despite no rule permitting or preventing the
appointment.224  The Court stated, “at least in the absence of legisla-
tion to the contrary” courts have an “inherent power to provide them-
selves with appropriate instruments required for the performance of
their duties.”225  This includes the power to “appoint persons uncon-
nected with the court to aid judges in the performance of specific judi-
216. 757 F.2d. 557 (3d Cir. 1985).
217. Id. at 561–62.
218. A Preliminary Report on the Advisability and Feasibility of Developing Uniform Rules of
Evidence for the United States District Courts, 30 F.R.D. 73, 101 (1962). The number of assertions
of inherent power by federal courts led one scholar to note the following: “the only fair ques-
tion. . .is not whether inherent power exists at all, but rather, what is the scope of such power?”
Charles W. Joiner & Oscar J. Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule
Making, 55 MICH. L. REV. 623, 626 (1957).
219. Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985).
220. Id.
221. Id. (citing cases).
222. Id. at 561–63.
223. Id. at 563.
224. In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312–13 (1920).
225. Id. at 312.
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cial duties.”226  Other examples cited by the Eash Court are the power
to certify questions to a state court, grant bail in a situation not dealt
with by statute, and dismiss a suit under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.227
Sounding deceptively simple and intuitive, the doctrinal basis and
boundaries of this power are less clear.  In In re Peterson the Supreme
Court suggested it is an equitable power.  Since “the commencement
of our government, [such inherent power] has been exercised by the
federal courts, when sitting in equity, by appointing, either with or
without the consent of the parties, special masters, auditors, examin-
ers, and commissioners.”228  In fact, exertions of inherent power ex-
tend back to the founding of the country.  In 1790, the Supreme Court
established requirements for attorneys who could appear before it229
and adopted “the practice of the courts of King’s Bench and Chancery
in England, as affording outlines for the practice of this court . . . .”230
Similarly, prior to the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts created evi-
dentiary rules in common law fashion.231
The key limitation of the Useful Rules Power is that its use cannot
contravene legislation.232  Recall that in In re Peterson the Court up-
held the appointment of an auditor “at least in the absence of legisla-
tion to the contrary.”233  Illustrating this limit is Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,234 where despite the Court’s inher-
ent power to assess attorney’s fees it could not do so.  The Court held
226. Id.
227. Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d. 557, 564 (3d Cir. 1985). See also United States v.
Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 505–10 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (implying a materiality requirement
into a federal false statement statute in part because “[w]hen Congress enacted the current ver-
sion of the law in 1948, a period marked by a spirit of cooperation between Congress and the
Federal Judiciary, Congress looked to the courts to play an important role in the lawmaking
process by relying on common-law tradition and common sense to fill gaps in the law—even to
imply causes of action and remedies that were not set forth in statutory text”).
228. In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312–13 (1920). See also ITT Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. Barton,
569 F.2d 1351, 1359 (5th Cir. 1978) (inherent powers are “rooted in the notion that a federal
court, sitting in equity, possesses all of the common law equity tools of a Chancery Court (sub-
ject, of course, to congressional limitation) to process litigation to a just and equitable
conclusion.”).
229. Appointment of Justices, 2 U.S. 399, 399 (1790).
230. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 408, 411 (1792).
231. See, e.g., Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 382 (1933) (federal courts could articulate
current common law rules on spousal testimony in the absence of congressional legislation);
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340–41 (1943) (the Court held a criminal confession
inadmissible because of a court’s inherent power over the creation and maintenance of “civilized
standards of procedure and evidence.”).
232. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985) (“Even a sensible and efficient use of the super-
visory power, however, is invalid if it conflicts with constitutional or statutory provisions.”).
233. In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312–13 (1920).
234. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
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that federal law created a list of inapplicable exceptions to the general
ban on awarding attorney fees, and thus creating a new exception
would conflict with congressional policy.235  Similarly, in Societe Inter-
nationale v. Rogers, the Court refused to use its inherent power to
dismiss a claim for noncompliance with a discovery order because a
FRCP provision controlled.236 Additionally, Bank of Nova Scotia v.
United States barred federal courts from using their “supervisory
power” to circumvent a rule of criminal procedure.237  Thus, this
power is a gap-filling measure.  When there is no rule or law on point
courts can use their equitable, inherent Useful Rules Power to step in.
But inherent powers exist that do not stem from practicality and do
not yield to every law, rule, and policy of another branch of govern-
ment.  A second form of inherent power is the ability to create rules
“essential to the administration of justice” and “‘absolutely essential’
for the functioning of the judiciary” (the “Qualified Essential Rules
Power”).238  It is “implied from strict functional necessity” and can be
regulated through legislation but may not be “abrogated nor rendered
practically inoperative.”239  This type of inherent power permits courts
to fine for contempt or to imprison to preserve courtroom order, both
of which “are powers which cannot be dispensed within a court, be-
cause they are necessary to the exercise of all other[ ] [judicial pow-
ers]. . . .”240  For example, the Supreme Court has noted that the
contempt power is inherent in all courts because it is essential to the
administration of justice that courts be able to vindicate their own au-
thority without complete dependence on other branches.241  Without
it, “what the Constitution now fittingly calls ‘the judicial power of the
United States’ would be a mere mockery.”242  The power to dismiss
sua sponte for lack of prosecution is also an inherent power of federal
235. Id. at 269.
236. 357 U.S. 197, 207 (1958). See also Mills v. Bank of United States, 24 U.S. 431, 439–40
(1826) (upholding local rule designed to further justice and save costs in part because it did not
interfere with any rules of evidence). Cf. Shane v. McNeil, 41 N.W. 166, 168 (Iowa 1889) (legis-
lature enabled judicial conference to make laws but if conference fails to act each court has
common law power to make rules that do not conflict with laws or conference’s rules).
237. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988) (“We now hold that a
federal court may not invoke supervisory power to circumvent the harmless-error inquiry pre-
scribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a).”).
238. Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d. 557, 562–63 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Levine v.
United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1959)).
239. Id. at 562–63.
240. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812).
241. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 795–96 (1987).
242. Id. at 796 (citing Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911)). See
Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 132 n.12 (1992) (acknowledging inherent power), aff’d
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 392 (1989).
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courts, “governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily
vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the or-
derly and expeditious disposition of cases.”243  One could view the
Qualified Essential Rules Power, which is perhaps the most ambigu-
ous of the court’s inherent powers, as a limit on legislative authority.
Some powers must exist and while Congress can step in and regulate
them, some portion of these powers is beyond congressional control
and lies exclusively within the province of the judiciary.
The third and most powerful form of inherent power permits fed-
eral courts to act in direct contradiction of legislation.244  According to
the Eash court, once Congress creates a federal court, that court is
vested with the judicial powers of Article III.245  This “irreducible in-
herent authority” covers “an extremely narrow range of authority in-
volving activity so fundamental to the essence of a court as a
constitutional tribunal that to divest the court of absolute command
within this sphere is really to render practically meaningless the terms
‘court’ and ‘judicial power’” (the “Fundamental Rules Power”).246
Examples of such power are rare,247 but may include rules that protect
against legislation that prevents judges from judging or inhibits “the
effective resolution of justiciable controversies.”248  For instance, the
Supreme Court protected the independence of the judiciary by ban-
ning legislative “rules of decision” because “Congress ha[d] inadver-
tently passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial
power.”249  The dimensions of this power are notoriously unclear, in
part because federal courts have rarely, if ever, applied such a
power.250  The boundaries of this power “are not possible to locate
243. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962).
244. Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d. 557, 562 (3d Cir. 1985).
245. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1.  (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.”). See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986)
(stating Article III Section 1 protects judiciary from other branches and protects litigant rights);
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 368 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (judicial independence
benefits litigants).
246. Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d. 557, 562 (3d Cir. 1985).
247. See A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-
Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 29–33 (1958) (describing
instances in which legislatures might abridge judicial power through rulemaking).
248. Id. at 30.
249. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146–47 (1871).
250. Benjamin H. Barton, An Article I Theory of the Inherent Powers of the Federal Courts, 61
CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 43 (2011) (“The third category of cases, in which the Court has found
inherent authority to act in an area where Congress has spoken, are the most difficult to recon-
cile. Nevertheless, even in these cases, the Court has never explicitly claimed a power superior to
that of Congress. Instead, the Court has always found that Congress did not foreclose the inher-
ent power at issue.”).
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with exactitude” and such a power “must be exercised with great re-
straint and caution.”  Regardless of the lack of clarity, the Fundamen-
tal Rules Power is essential to the separation of powers.251
3. Courts Used Their Inherent Power to Create the Hickman Work
Product Doctrine
Although never recognized by courts, Hickman falls within the con-
tours of the inherent powers doctrine. Hickman (and Nobles) arose
when no rule or statute governed and compelling policies applied.
Hickman is based on public policy and not on any statutory or consti-
tutional source.  The public policy is “the orderly prosecution and de-
fense of legal claims,”252 which, like exertions of inherent power,
concerns the administration of justice and resolution of cases.  The
critical question is which type of inherent power the Court used to
decide Hickman.
Recall the strong language of Hickman about the critical roles of
the work product doctrine.  The Court noted “discovery, like all mat-
ters of procedure, has ultimate and necessary boundaries.”253  Plus, “it
is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy,” for
that “is the historical and the necessary way in which lawyers act
within the framework of our system of jurisprudence to promote jus-
tice and to protect their clients’ interests.”254  And “[n]ot even the
most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted inquiries
into the files and the mental impressions of an attorney.”255  This lan-
guage suggests neither rules nor statutes can, in whole or in part, elim-
inate or curtail work product.  Such language supports the use of the
Qualified Essential Rules Power or even the Fundamental Rules
Power.
But remember, the Court wrote that the public policies in Hickman
apply “until some rule or statute definitely prescribes otherwise.”256
This concern has been present since the beginning.  When the Third
Circuit decided Hickman it carefully noted courts must abide by poli-
cies “adopted either by rule-making court or legislature.”257  Tellingly,
in Nobles the Supreme Court upheld a waiver of work product protec-
tion.  Because no codified rule applied, Nobles was a public policy ex-
251. Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d. 557, 562 (3d Cir. 1985).
252. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947).
253. Id. at 507.
254. Id. at 510–11.
255. Id. at 510.
256. Id. at 514.
257. Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 219 (3d Cir. 1945).
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tension of Hickman.  Yet the Court found waiver was possible.  This
conclusion suggests countervailing public policies can override work
product protection.   Discussed more fully below, later Supreme Court
decisions also suggest rules and statutes can eliminate or curtail the
Hickman work product doctrine.  These decisions suggest, and this
Article concludes, courts are relying on the Useful Rules Power.
Adding weight to this conclusion is Professor Barton’s view that
Congress’s Article I power under the Necessary and Proper Clause,
not Article III’s Judicial Powers Clause, controls the judiciary’s use of
inherent powers.258  After analyzing the Constitution’s text and his-
tory, and Supreme Court precedent, Professor Barton concluded that
“Congress has near plenary authority over the structure and proce-
dure of the federal courts” and “the judiciary has substantial authority
to act [only] when Congress has not acted.”259
C. The Limits of the Hickman Work Product Doctrine: Rules and
Statutes Preempt Hickman
The Hickman work product doctrine likely stems from the Useful
Rules Power and thus can be limited and even eliminated by rules and
statutes.  A preemption analysis involves assessing the public policies
underlying Hickman.  Work product protects attorney preparation
and the privacy of attorney mental processes.260  While these policies
undoubtedly are important, they are subject to an override under the
separation of powers.  In light of the decisions and authorities dis-
cussed below, the policies of Hickman are not so essential and funda-
mental to the judicial system so as to withstand editing and
modification by the democratically elected legislative and executive
branches.
1.  Public Policy Opposing Absolute Work Product Protection
Elevating work product protection to a more privileged category
covered by either the Qualified Essential Rules or Fundamental Rules
Powers creates several problems.  First, it alters work product from
being a public policy to being a structural component of the judicial
system.  Such a seismic change would be odd given that work product
only arose after a switch to a discovery-based judicial system.  Indeed,
the doctrine has evolved because of different views on policy.  In the
beginning the Supreme Court rejected a rule granting expansive
258. Barton, supra note 252, at 5, 39.
259. Id. at 5–6; see also Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996) (“In many instances
the inherent powers of the courts may be controlled or overridden by statute or rule.”).
260. Anderson et al., supra note 11, at 784–85.
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power and instead decided Hickman.  When Hickman proved unman-
ageable the Judicial Conference developed Rules 26(b)(3) and 16.
And the choice to have discovery is itself a public policy determina-
tion; nothing—other than policy considerations—prevents Congress
from choosing a different system or returning to the pre-FRCP era.
Unlike individual constitutional rights, structural protections are usu-
ally not waivable.261  Thus, if courts deem work product essential or
fundamental to the integrity of the judicial system it would strip from
attorneys and clients the discretion to waive protection (which not
even the attorney-client privilege does).  Such absolute protection
raises the ethical issue of whether attorneys are bound to protect the
integrity of the judicial system by avoiding waiver even when it may
be in the client’s best interest to waive protection.  Also, currently in
certain circumstances an unintentional disclosure can lead to waiver of
undisclosed protected material.262  This exception, and the waiver of
protection, conflicts with notions of fundamental or essential
protection.
Second, elevating work product to a higher level of protection
would compound the problems of an already unwieldy doctrine.  If
work product plays a core role in the justice system, is its disclosure
reversible error?  If the trial court erred, or the attorney improperly
disclosed work product material (intentionally or unintentionally),
how could it not be reversible error if work product is essential to the
justice system?  Could a court apply a workable standard weighing the
effect of such disclosure on the integrity of the judicial system?  Would
its disclosure support a finding of an unfair trial, denial of due process,
or ineffective assistance of counsel?  If it is essential or fundamental,
can it ever be waived?  If so, how do courts determine when such
waiver applies and the scope of the waiver?  Since its birth courts
struggled to define work product and articulate workable standards.
This elevation of protection would create a Russian nesting doll of
Pandora’s boxes.
261. See, e.g., Freytag v. C.I.R., 501 U.S. 868, 880 (1991) (“Neither Congress nor the Executive
can agree to waive [the Appointment Clause’s] structural protection.”); Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 849 (1986) (“When these Article III limitations are at
issue, notions of consent and waiver cannot be dispositive because the limitations serve institu-
tional interests that the parties cannot be expected to protect.”); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of
Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 543–44 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The component of the
separation of powers rule that protects the integrity of the constitutional structure, as distinct
from the component that protects the rights of the litigants, cannot be waived by the parties
. . . .”)
262. FED. R. EVID. 502(b).
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Perhaps the strongest countervailing policy comes from Federal
Rule of Evidence 502, which recognizes a subject-matter waiver of un-
disclosed, otherwise-protected work product.  Under the rule, an in-
tentional disclosure of work product will waive protection to
undisclosed material concerning the same subject matter when “they
ought in fairness be considered together.”263  The rule protects undis-
closed material from waiver by an unintentional disclosure only if the
“holder” of the protection “took reasonable steps to prevent disclo-
sure” and “promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error.”264
Crucially, this rule permits the intentional and unintentional acts of
attorneys and clients to waive protection of undisclosed protected ma-
terial.  Furthermore, the rule defines “work product protection” as
“the protection that applicable law provides for tangible material (or
its intangible equivalent) prepared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial.”265 Notably the Rule references both tangible and intangible ma-
terial.  Recall that FRCP 26(b)(3) only applies to tangible material
while Hickman spoke of tangible and intangible material.  This phras-
ing  suggests the phrase “applicable law” refers to protection stem-
ming from both rules and Hickman.  Thus, the rule permits the acts of
attorneys and clients to waive both codified work product and Hick-
man work product protection.  Notably, there is no exception for core
work product.  As a rule of evidence passed by Congress, it establishes
federal policy.266
2. Preemption of Hickman
Two Supreme Court decisions support the view that rules and stat-
utes can preempt Hickman.  In 1976 the Supreme Court approved a
congressional curtailment of work product protection. Goldberg v.
United States concerned the Jencks Act, which permitted criminal de-
fendants access to any statements adopted or approved by prosecution
witnesses.267  While such statements might be work product, the Court
held they were discoverable under the statute.268  However, in the
same breath, the Court was careful to explain why the Jencks Act did
not undermine the public policies of Hickman.  Specifically, (i) there
is no danger an attorney will distort a witness’s statements when the
witness adopts or approves the attorney’s notes, (ii) there is a clear
263. FED. R. EVID. 502(a).
264. FED. R. EVID. 502(b).
265. FED. R. EVID. 502(g)(2).
266. Pub. L. No. 110–322, §1(a) (2008).
267. 425 U.S. 94, 104 (1976).
268. Id. at 105–08.
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and congressionally recognized purpose of disclosure to impeach wit-
nesses and thus ensure a fair and just criminal trial, (iii) the lawyer is
not serving as a witness, and (iv) there is no plausible concern that
government attorneys will be called to authenticate their notes or will
feel compelled to testify.269  Nonetheless, the case reflects a statutory
override stripping protection of otherwise protected material.
Later, the Supreme Court more explicitly referenced the possibility
of a congressional override.  Its 1981 decision in Upjohn Co. v. United
States held work product material gathered by a corporate counsel
was immune from an IRS summons.  The Court reasoned the sum-
mons were “subject to the traditional privileges and limitations” and
“[n]othing in the language of the IRS summons provisions or their
legislative history suggests an intent on the part of Congress to preclude
application of the work-product doctrine.”270 Upjohn shows courts
look to whether Congress has altered work product protection in a
particular case, as it did in Goldberg.
Both cases support the view that Congress can override work prod-
uct protection, but neither expands on how much rules and statutes
can limit the doctrine, or whether Congress could eliminate the
doctrine.
Under the logic of Goldberg and Upjohn there is a compelling argu-
ment that Hickman does not supplement FRCP 26 to protect intangi-
ble work product.  With a rule on point, the Useful Rules Power does
not apply.  As Professor Clermont argued, within the realm covered
by FRCP 26, “the rule preempts Hickman” and potentially more nar-
rowly construes the anticipation of litigation requirement.271  Thus, for
certain questions within the scope of the rule, “authoritative answers
derive from the rule and not from Hickman.”272  While Hickman’s
policies may “inform a reading of the rule,”  “[n]evertheless, inter-
preting a rule presents a task jurisprudentially distinct from elaborat-
ing a case-law doctrine.”273  Therefore, Hickman governs questions
raised beyond the scope of FRCP 26, like work product assertions at
trial or pertaining to non-parties.274  By specifically limiting protection
to tangible work product, intangible work product is arguably within
the policy scope of FRCP 26 but excluded from protection.  Thus, like
269. Id. at 107.
270. 449 U.S. 383, 399–400 (1981) (emphasis added).
271. Clermont, supra note 18, at 757.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 757–58.
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the scenario in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.,275 courts lack the inher-
ent power to contravene the text and policy of the rule.
3. Preemption of Core Work Product Protection
The great battleground is whether a rule or statute can override
Hickman’s protection of core work product.  Advocates seeking pro-
tection could argue that, unlike the material at issue in Goldberg and
Upjohn, core work product is protected by a stronger form of inherent
power, like the Qualified Essential Rules or Fundamental Rules Pow-
ers.  They would call upon Hickman’s strong “necessary” and “essen-
tial” language.
In Upjohn, the Court noted there is a higher burden to obtain work
product of oral witness statements for they could reveal an attorney’s
mental impressions.276 Upjohn recognized that some courts have held
no showing of necessity can overcome work product protection of oral
witness statements.  Other courts grant oral witness statements special
but not inalienable protection.277  Without deciding the issue, the
Court appealed to both Hickman and FRCP 26:
As Rule 26 and Hickman make clear, such work product cannot be
disclosed simply on a showing of substantial need and inability to
obtain the equivalent without undue hardship.  While we are not
prepared at this juncture to say that such material is always pro-
tected by the work product rule, we think a far stronger showing of
necessity and unavailability by other means than was made by the
Government or applied by the Magistrate in this case would be nec-
essary to compel disclosure.278
Thus, Upjohn leaves the issue open.
But several sources undermine the notion that core work product
can receive absolute protection. Hickman’s protection of core work
product derives from public policy.  Recall that the Supreme Court
rejected the 1946 proposed work product rule that granted absolute
protection to core work product and instead decided Hickman.279  Al-
though rare, courts have permitted discovery of core work product
when these policies were not present or contrary policies overrode
them.280  The “necessary” and “essential” language in Hickman is best
viewed as the Court applying strong language to support the highly
275. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
276. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 399 (1981).
277. Id. at 401.
278. Id. at 401–02.
279. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2026.
280. Morrow, supra note 20, at 1162 & 1165 n. 75 (citing examples); 8 WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 13, § 2026 (“[L]ower courts have found such disclosure justified principally where the
material is directly at issue, particularly if the lawyer or law firm is a party to the litigation.”).
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unusual step of ruling on the grounds of public policy.  The Court’s
apprehension seemed to acknowledge it was filling in a gap until a
rule applied.
In at least one context several lower courts have suggested a statute
or rule could authorize the disclosure of core work product.  There is a
split amongst courts as to what extent FRCP 26(b)(4) permits disclo-
sure of work product materials related to expert reports.  Some say
the 1993 FRCP amendments broadened the scope of expert discovery
and are “widely interpreted to override work product protections for
materials provided to retained expert witnesses” including core work
product.281  Other courts conclude the rule permits disclosure of fac-
tual work product and not core work product, but the rule could do so
if there was clear language: “For the high privilege accorded attorney
opinion work product not to apply would require clear and unambigu-
ous language in a statute.”282  Regardless, what all these courts agree
on is that (i) at a minimum FRCP 26(b)(4) overrides factual work
product protection and (ii) a rule or statute can override opinion work
product.
D. Summary
In light of its origin and history, the Hickman work product doc-
trine stems from the Useful Rules inherent power of courts.  While its
importance is undeniable, it is not a proper exercise of the Qualified
Essential Rules or Fundamental Rules Powers given repeated lan-
guage from its birth to the present day suggesting rules and statutes
can curtail any aspect of protection.  Also, advocates can waive its
protection, which is inconsistent with something fundamental to the
structure of the judicial system.283  Further, absolute protection would
281. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2031. See, e.g., Karn v. Rand, 168 F.R.D. 633, 639
(N.D. Ind. 1996) (“In this Court’s view, new Rule 26 and its supporting commentary reveal that
the drafters considered the imperfect alignment between 26(b)(3) and 26(b)(4) under the old
Rule, and clearly resolved it by providing that the requirements of (a)(2) ‘trump’ any assertion
of work product or privilege.”); Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 384, 387 (N.D.
Cal. 1991) (“For reasons set forth at length below, we hold that, absent an extraordinary showing
of unfairness that goes well beyond the interests generally protected by the work product doc-
trine, written and oral communications from a lawyer to an expert that are related to matters
about which the expert will offer testimony are discoverable, even when those communications
otherwise would be deemed opinion work product.”).
282. Haworth, Inc. v. Herman Miller, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 289, 295 (W.D. Mich. 1995); see, e.g.,
Magee v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 172 F.R.D. 627, 642–43 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (“Rule 26(a)
should not be construed as vitiating the attorney work product privilege, and the laudable poli-
cies behind it, in the absence of clear and unambiguous authority under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.”); Nexxus Prods. Co. v. CVS New York, Inc., 188 F.R.D. 7, 8–11 (D. Mass.
1999).
283. FED. R. EVID. 502.
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favor—rather than balance—the judicial system’s interests to the ex-
clusion of client interests.  While core work product merits distinction
and special protection, modern case law suggests it too is subject to a
legislative or rule-based override.  Although rare, courts have permit-
ted discovery of core work product or have suggested a willingness to
permit such discovery.  Thus, the most likely explanation is that Hick-
man work product is the result of the Useful Rules Power and is pre-
empted by any conflicting rule or statute.
IV. CONCLUSION
With good reason work product has been intensely litigated in
courts and thoroughly discussed by advisory committees.  Its unique
status as a “qualified privilege” that stems from both codified rules
and Supreme Court common law justified solely on the grounds of
public policy, readily distinguishes it from any other doctrine.  But
courts, practitioners, and scholars cannot turn away from the inherent
complexities of the doctrine, settle for a superficial understanding, and
adopt assumptions with questionable foundations.  Historically, courts
have always acknowledged the need to defer to the legislature on pol-
icy decisions about the judicial system.  Even the strongest of policies
does not alter the separation of powers.
By engaging the doctrine and understanding its history, glimpses of
clarity appear.  First, the Supreme Court and federal courts created
and expanded the Hickman work product doctrine through the use of
their inherent powers.  Second, Hickman and its progeny survive de-
spite the codification of the work product doctrine.  Third, even in the
context of the highly protected realm of core work product, a rule or
statute can override the Hickman work product doctrine.
The impact of these conclusions can change the course of litigation
and trials.  Most notably, work product is not as expansive as most
courts and practitioners assume.  The varying coverage between the
codified rules and Hickman creates an opening for discovery.  At the
same time, courts will struggle to rule on this claim.  A decision re-
quires explaining the basis for the Supreme Court’s decision in Hick-
man.  That is an answer courts have no precedent on.  If courts agree
with this Article, then they will issue a rare, but thorough, ruling about
inherent powers.   While clarity is certainly needed, it will be difficult
to provide concrete analysis using such a nebulous doctrine.  Work
product is often spoken of as a purely discovery doctrine or a doctrine
defined in a subset of a rule.  But it is so much more and implicates
some of the most challenging and essential parts of a judicial system.
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Perhaps the best course is for the Judicial Conference to re-examine
the codified rules, which have remained largely unchanged since their
inception.  The Conference should consider whether the rules should
align with one another, and whether the rules should match or exceed
the scope of Hickman.  The Conference should also consider whether
there is a need for codified rules about work product protection
outside the discovery context.
We have come a long way since the concerns raised in the first days
of the FRCP, addressed in Hickman, and revisited in the FRCP and
criminal rules.  But many of the work product issues perplexing courts
and practitioners remain.
